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SHEPPARD v. COMMONWEALTH
250 Va. 379, 464 S.E.2d 131 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On November 30,1993, police discovered the bodies of Richard A.
Rosenbluth and his wife, Rebecca, in the den of their home. The victims
had been killed two days earlier. Mr. Rosenbluth had been shot twice by
a .38 caliber revolver, Mrs. Rosenbluth had been shot four times: twice
with a .38 caliber revolver and twice with a .45 caliber automatic
handgun. 1
On December 3, Mark A. Sheppard was arrested after police
discovered him attempting to set fire to Mr. Rosenbluth's car. The
Commonwealth charged Sheppard with three indictments for capital
murder,2 two indictments for robbery, and four indictments for the use
of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
3
Although Sheppard admitted that he was present at the Rosenbluth's
house at the time of the murders, he testified at trial that he had not
participated in the killings, claiming that he was in another room of the
house while his co-defendant, Andre Graham, and a third party commit-
ted the murders. The jury, however, convicted Sheppard of all charges.
At the penalty stage, the jury sentenced Sheppard to death based on both
the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating factors.
4
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic review
of Sheppard's death sentence with his other appeals based on the capital
murder conviction. The appeal alleged various substantive errors at the
penalty stage, as well as an error in refusing to allow the jury to hear that
Sheppard's co-defendant had received a life sentence rather than the
death penalty. The court upheld the convictions and the death sentence.
5
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Future Dangerousness Claims That Were Dismissed for
Failure to Properly Raise Them on Appeal
In an alarming decision that violates fundamental notions of fair
play, the Supreme Court of Virginia set up a novel procedural bar to a
number of Sheppard's claims that elevates formalism to new and
possibly unconstitutional heights. In his assignments of error, Sheppard
did not state a general challenge to thejury's finding of future dangerous-
1 Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 382-84,464 S.E.2d
131, 133-34 (1995).
2 Id. at 382,464 S.E.2d at 133. Two of the capital murder indictments
were based on the killings of each of the Rosenbluths in the commission of
a robbery in accordance with Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(4); the third
indictment was based on the two killings as part of the same act or
transaction in accordance with Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7). Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 383, 464 S.E.2d at 134.
5 Id. at 386,396,464 S.E.2d at 134, 141. The court rejected some of
the defendant's assignments of error in brief, conclusive language. Others
did not involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings provide little,
if any guidance because they apply broad, settled principles of law to facts
specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in these categories include: (1)
ness. Instead, he assigned seven specific errors arising out of the
sentencing phase which, he argued, rendered the jury's future dangerous-
ness finding invalid. These errors included matters such as improperly
admitting unadjudicated acts, improperly allowing the jury to observe
the victim of an unrelated maiming in which Sheppard allegedly partici-
pated, improperly admitting evidence of his conduct in prison, improp-
erly admitting testimony regarding the defendant's statements about
other criminal activity, denying a motion for a new sentencing hearing
because Sheppard was denied individualized sentencing consideration
by the jury, failure of the Commonwealth to inform Sheppard of
exculpatory evidence, and improperly admitting testimony by a crimi-
nologist.
6
The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to review these assignments
of error, stating for each one that because the defendant had not assigned
error as to the general finding of future dangerousness, alleged specific
errors relating to future dangerousness would not be reviewed. For
example, in denying review of the error of improper admission of
evidence.of unadjudicated crimes, the court stated:
We do not reach this question for decision. The defendant has
failed to assign error to the jury's finding of future dangerous-
ness. SeeRules 5:22(b); 5:17(c). Therefore, the defendant will
not be allowed to challenge the admission of any evidence
relevant to that predicate about which there is no claim of
invalidity.
7
In other words, because Sheppard did not include a throw-away
general challenge to the future dangerousness finding, but instead
specifically stated why different components of the future dangerous-
ness finding were in error, the court refused to consider each of the
particular assignments of error.
The court's decision to deny review is highly troubling and violates
Sheppard's due process rights. First, Sheppard had no notice of the
procedural bar which the Supreme Court of Virginia invoked in his case.
The rules the court cited do not support its reasoning. Rule 5:22(b) gives
the appellant ten days from the "Filing Date" to file the assignments of
errors, supplemented with specifications of the relevant portion of the
record. It then gives the appellee ten days from the filing of the
assignment of errors to file any additional portions of the record which
it deems relevant.
8
four assignments of error not discussed because of the defendant's failure
to brief and argue them; (2) claims that the trial court erred in excluding
three jurors for cause; (3) a claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict; (4) a claim that the refusal of the trial judge to allow
defense counsel to question potential jurors about "mitigation" on voir dire
was error, (5) a claim that the denial of a motion to suppress evidence found
in defendant's home was error, (6) a claim that the prosecutor engaged in
prejudicial argument in both the trial and penalty phases of the bifurcated
trial; (7) a claim that thejury should have been instructed that they could find
Sheppard guilty of accessory after the fact; and, (8) a claim that the jury's
finding of aggravated battery was not based on sufficient evidence.
6 Id. at 391-395, 464 S.E.2d at 138-41.
7 Id. at 391,464 S.E.2d at 139.
8 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:22(b).
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Likewise, Rule 5:17(c) does not support the Supreme Court of
Virginia's argument. Although it does describe assignments of error, it
does not require that one formally state the more general error before
alleging the specific errors for which any relief would actually be
granted. In fact, the rule states that "[ain assignment of error which
merely states that the judgment or award is contrary to the law and the
evidence is not sufficient." 9 Thus, Sheppard actually complied with the
spirit of the written rule by submitting the more specific assignments of
error required by the rule.
Moreover, Sheppard's assignments of error were completely in
accord with the purposes of such assignments as the Supreme Court of
Virginia itself has described them. In Yeatts v. Murray,10 the defendant
challenged the circuit court's dismissal of his habeas petition without
ordering an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that "[t]his assign-
ment of error only challenges the alleged procedural failure to order an
evidentiary hearing; it does not challenge, with reasonable certainty, the
habeas court's substantive ruling on the merits of the ineffective assis-
tance claims." I1 In Sheppard's case, he did exactly what the Supreme
Court of Virginia had wanted in Yeatts. Instead of merely challenging the
general defect, Sheppard claimed error on specific substantive grounds.
Thus, Sheppard should have been applauded for following the desires of
the Supreme Court of Virginia in that he clearly announced exactly what
he was arguing.
Finally, not only do the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia belie
the court's analysis, the court had not applied this rule to prior capital
cases. 12 Because no rule requires a throw-away assignment of error that
challenges the finding of the aggravating factor generally, and because
the Supreme Court of Virginia had not required such an assignment in
previous cases, Sheppard had no notice of this requirement; thus, he was
denied due process.
Because of the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in this case, it
is imperative that defense counsel include a general assignment of error
for each aggravating factor as a violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The brief should state that the assignment of
error was made in order to avoid default under Sheppard and that the
specific errors giving rise to this error are developed in each assignment
of error.
9 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17(c).
10 249 Va. 285,455 S.E.2d 18 (1995); see case summary of Yeatts,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 27 (1995).
11 Id. at 291,455 S.E.3d at 22.
12 See Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501,450 S.E.2d 146
(1994), reviewing defendant's claim of improper admission of evidence
of unadjudicated acts even though defendant did not challenge the jury's
finding of aggravating circumstance.
13 220 Va. 243,254, 257 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1979).
14 Sheppard, 250 Va. at 390-91,464 S.E.2d at 138.
15 Id.
I. A Co-Defendant's Life Sentence As Mitigation Evidence
Sheppard argued that because he and his co-defendant were equally
culpable for the murders, the jury should have been allowed to hear that
his co-defendanthad been sentenced to life imprisonment plus a $100,000
fine. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument. Quoting
Coppola v. Commonwealth,13 the court stated that such information was
"'irrelevant to the determination by the jury of the appropriate punish-
ment for the defendant.' 14 The court explained that the statutory scheme
required the appellate court to perform a comparison analysis, but it did
not require such an analysis by the jury. The court stated that the jury's
analysis should instead focus on the defendant's history and his conduct
in committing the present crime.
15
This particular issue has not been resolved by the United States
Supreme Court. However, capital murder defendants should be allowed
under the constitution to inform the jury of a co-defendant's sentence as
evidence in mitigation. In Lockett v. Ohio, the United States Supreme
Court held that the jury must "not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigqtingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death."'16 Therefore, if the sentence of the co-
defendant is considered a circumstance of the offense, the jury should not
be precluded from hearing such evidence. In fact, several other jurisdic-
tions have already held that evidence of a co-defendant's sentence should
be allowed as mitigation evidence.
1 7
The argument that the jury should be allowed to hear such evidence
is especially important in Virginia, for although the court in rejecting
Sheppard's argument had said that the co-defendant's sentence was
appropriate for appellate proportionality review, later in the opinion it
declined to compare Sheppard's sentence to that of his co-defendant.
1 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia thus continues to engage in a cursory
proportionality review. It follows that any meaningful comparison of a
defendant and co-defendant's sentences will come only if the evidence
is presented to the jury. Not allowing the defendant to introduce a co-
defendant's sentence into evidence is both bad policy and a violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
Summary and analysis by:
Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond
16 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
17 See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 511 So.2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1987)
(stating that "the sentence that a co-defendant receives is relevant and
may be considered by the judge and jury in determining the appropriate
sentence.");Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103, 110 (Fla. 1992) (stating that
"disparate treatment accorded [a co-defendant] ... may have served as
a reasonable basis for the recommendation [of life rather than death.");
andState v. Stokey, 185 Ariz. 505,523,898 P.2d 454,472 (1995) (stating
that "sentences of co-defendants may be considered in mitigation.").
18 Sheppard, 250 Va. at 390, 395, 464 S.E.2d at 138, 141.
